Regrettable Episode
Unfolding Again!!
Roobdoon Forum
roobdoon2000@yahoo.ca
November 21,
2005
Prime
Minister Ali Muhammad Ghedi’s recent comments on the issue of “One
Somalia” principle (or Somali Weyn concept) raised some eyebrows [1]. The
Prime Minister spoke about the relations between the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) of Somalia and the neighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia, pointing out that there is no
territorial (and people) dispute between them.
Ghedi’s comments underlined that Somalia and its neighbours together, as IGAD
members, could form the starting point for securing stability in the region and
building an economic and political cooperation.
This, in turn, can guarantee the basis for a new socio-political
framework of permanent well-being of all Somalis in the Horn of Africa.
This “optimistic
outreach” has been interpreted differently, especially Somalis in the
Diaspora. However, the majority of the
Somalis in the Diaspora insist that Ghedi chose to shorten his journey to
political ascendancy; and more importantly, the new TFG which also opted to
mute Somali Weyn cause will surely find itself navigating in unmarked,
maybe dangerous waters, like the elected 1967 civil government. To realize to the extent of the problem, many
Somalis in the Diaspora have never, to begin with, accepted the peace-brokered
efforts of Ethiopia and Kenya as genuine; they believe that it was
a careful orchestrated scheme set up to lead Somalis to relax its Somali
Weyn vigilance. In gathering
places, you see Somalis fiercely debating whether any peace brokered by Somali neighbours
could be real!
Furthermore,
some political analysts have recently drawn to the conclusion that the Somali
nation-State, as it was before the civil wars, is hardly to re-emerge. Yet, as an ethnic group, Somalis do play a
vital role in the stability and the development of the region. This paradox is seemingly but exceptionally
contradictory. Somali nomads were
roaming in the Somali Peninsula for centuries, mostly without a
Central Authority. Despite the many
instances of clan-warfare, dismemberment, and anarchy, Somalis have always
maintained the capabilities to deflect any permanent
domination/occupation. There is always a
common Somali denominator in the minds of the nomads, even though it does not
manifest in their dealings of clan-politics.
Therefore, foreign observers often find difficult to read nomads’
clan-politics; and therefore reach an elusive conclusion which frequently
manifest itself in futile. This short paper will therefore attempt to reflect
on the history of foreign complicity and manipulation in making “One Somalia” principle
somehow redeemable.
Since 1991,
Somali neighbours (particularly, Ethiopia and Kenya) have launched a series of political
maneuvers to realize their determination of convincing the general Somali
populace to swallow the unassailable Somali Weyn identity and
unification. Taking advantage of the current
Somali debacle, our neighbours have regularly intimidated Somali clan-elders,
faction leaders/warlords, and regional leaders to first and foremost abandon
any attempts that unify the Somalis and thus regenerate challenges against the
existence artificial boundaries inherited from the European colonial
administrations in the region. Thus,
whenever a Somali peace reconciliation conference is held in Ethiopia or Kenya, the host takes a more drastic, but
obvious covert actions to indicate to the Somalis that its toleration of any
tendencies of Somali Weyn is wearing thin. However, failure of such political maneuvers
to generate the desired intimidating effect will surely force the neighbouring
countries to resort to either more reckless military attacks on Somalia or galvanize the West to “contain” Somalia for them. To measure Kenya and Ethiopia’s success or failure in resolving
the territorial disputes, one has to look back the 1960s conflicts in the
region.
The
1960s Scenario
At the
inception of the Somali Republic in July 1st
1960, Somali
leaders openly put forth their ambitions to rehabilitate the sovereignty of all
Somalis in the Horn of Africa, including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier
District/Province of Kenya.
This political line has immediately strained the relations between the
new born Somali Republic and Ethiopia.
For some time, the two sides accused each other for territorial
violation and armed aggression on its borders.
These border clashes led Somalia to seek military aid from the former
U.S.S.R. On an interview conducted in
English at his office in November 30, 1963, the Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdirashid
Ali Shermarke, declared that “military aid promised by the Soviet Union is being accepted only because Somalia must defend itself from the
Ethiopian attacks and pillaging of the Somali peoples.” Premier Shermarke also explained Somalia’s
critical dilemma from an economic stand point in which he underlined that “
Somalia’s treasury could not much longer cope with the problem of feeding and sheltering
thousands of Somali refugees”, escaping from the mayhem caused by the Ethiopian
soldiers in the Ogaden region [2].
Extensive Political
and media provocations between the two sides have instigated a sudden but
sporadic bloody border clashes, as early as January of 1964. The Somali Foreign Minister, Abdullahi
Isse Mohamud had submitted an official protest letter to the Ethiopian
Ambassador in Mogadishu, Ahadu Sabura. By March of that year, the conflict widened
into a full-scale war, both arms confronting at border between Somalia and Ethiopia.
In these border clashes, Ethiopian military planes destroyed numerous
police posts and civilian houses inside Somalia.
Ethiopian military campaigns caused indiscriminate killings of civilians
and wounding many others. Ethiopian
border soldiers raided livestock belonging to Somali nomads and opend fire when
the nomads resisted.
Moreover, Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to form a mutual defense pact
that they referred as “a joint measures of dealing with the Somali
disturbances” – a move which Somalis considered “as contrary to the spirit of
the OAU” [3]. The few reconciliation efforts, in regional
level, that have been arranged also failed to produce any peace
settlements. At the Organization for
African Union (OAU) Summit Conference in Cairo (July 23, 1964), African
leaders have attempted to reach a ‘Resolution’ that satisfies on both sides;
however, it failed to do so. Somali News
in Mogadishu published that “Somalia will not be bound by the OAU ruling
[which states] that its member-States’ present frontier are to be maintained”,
in which the Somali National Assembly had passed a motion against OAU ruling,
in October of 1964. That is, the Somali
government officially rejected the outcome of the Cairo Conference, regarding
on frontier issues.
In a net
assessment of the outcome of the Somali-Ethiopian border skirmishes is that
Super Power interventions in the region have officially began. Somali sought the military and technical aid
of the Soviets; while the Ethiopian regime involved actively in convincing, as
it seems, the American Administration to tackle Somali Weyn cause.
In September
1974, a conference held in Washington, sponsored by the Center for the National
Security Studies was presented proceedings and papers on the subject of “The
CIA and Covert Action”. Roger Morris
and Richard Mauzy presented a comprehensive piece of research which is, as
they state, based on both written sources and many oral conversations that they
had with US decision-makers and foreign policy officials who supplied them many
of their research discourse [4]. The title of their research paper is: Following
the Scenario: Reflection on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath of
CIA Intervention.
Morris and
Mauzy unveil that the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency had been clandestinely
funneling mainly a financial support to the political actors in Somalia since mid 1960s, in an effort to
ward off Somali Weyn tendencies inside top brass leadership. In 1967 election campaigns, for example, the
CIA provided thousands of dollars to assist in the election of the Prime late
Prime Minister Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and some of his fellow Somali
Youth League (SYL) members. Here is a
selection from Morris and Mauzy’s case history of CIA ‘campaign of financing’
in the 1967 Somali elections:
An impoverished land of less than three
million along the northeastern coast of Africa where the Indian Ocean meets the Gulf of Aden, Somalia was of concern to Washington for a number of reasons. Irredentist claims threatened border warfare
with both Kenya and Ethiopia, the latter a long-time U.S. client state under Haile Selassie and the
site of a major intelligence base. Somalia was also an early recipient of Soviet aid
in Africa, and its coastline held potentially
strategic ports for any future rivalry in the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean, an interest shared by France and Britain. At
that, however, the country was apparently not an urgent concern in U.S. diplomacy.
When Somalia predictably rejected a 1963 American
offer of "defensive" arms, conditioned on the exclusion of all other
supplies, the State Department leaked its "displeasure" but seemingly
did no more.
Over the next four years, 1963-1967,
official U.S.-Somali relations were distant and U.S. aid next to nothing while Somali leaders
visited the Soviet bloc, Somali newspapers published anti-American forgeries
planted by Soviet intelligence, and the country fought a brief but bloody
border war with Ethiopia.
Then suddenly, early in 1967, history took a turn for the better. President Abd-i-Rashid Shermarke was elected
for a six-year term as President in June and in July appointed as Premier
Muhammad Egal, American-educated and avowedly pro-Western. By fall, U.S. aid
was resumed in amounts twice the previous total since independence, and Somalia
had concluded a border agreement with Ethiopia [see the footnote to read the
1967-68 Somali Border Agreements with Ethiopia and Kenya] [5]. In 1968 Egal visited the United States, following a visit to Somalia by Vice President Humphrey, and was hailed
by President Johnson as "enormously constructive in a troubled area of Africa."
What the two leaders did not discuss, say official sources, was how
"constructive" the CIA had been for Mr. Egal, whose rise, to
power was reportedly facilitated by thousands of dollars in covert support to
Egal and other pro-Western elements in the ruling Somali Youth League party
prior to the 1967 Presidential election.
In retrospect, this clandestine bankrolling
in Somalia seems very modest by CIA standards, only a
tiny fraction of what the Agency has spent in a month in Southeast Asia or even what it spent in the Congo in the early sixties. And its immediate benefits-in rising U.S. influence, in the detente with a grateful Ethiopia-no doubt seemed real enough at the
time. In any event, several sources say
the subsidies were discontinued in 1968.
But the withdrawal was to be perhaps too late. On October 15, 1969, while Egal was again visiting the United States, President Shermarke was
assassinated. A week later the Army
seized power, dissolving the National Assembly and Constitution and arresting
the entire Cabinet, including Egal.
Among the charges against Egal would be corruption of the electoral process
and complicity with foreign intelligence services. Ironically, the bizarre CIA political
contributions before 1967 may have been a decisive factor in the eventual fall
of the Agency's candidate [6].
Reflecting
the unwise decisions made by the CIA about its covert political interventions
and subsidies, Premier Egal’s government lasted less than three years. In October
21st 1969, a military led coup d'état replaced the civilian
government, detaining and charging (as mentioned above) the civilian Prime
Minister of ‘complicity with foreign intelligence’. The military men have
actually spoiled the CIA agenda – whether this was also instance of complicity
of another foreign factor/s or genuine local revolutionary respond that
vehemently opposed to the unfolding scenarios of border agreements, is
debatable. However, one thing was sure:
the military takeover was a bloodless transition that succeeded to frustrate
the pro-American elements in the country and ended the American subsidiary
civilian government. Italian writer, Luigi
Pestalozza, who observed and recorded the early unfolding events of the
Somali military Revolution states that “No tears were shed for the men who thus
left the stage forever, disappearing from the [political] history of Somalia [7].”
The military
regime soon declared to the commitments of “Greater Somali” doctrine, stressing
that colonialism comes in all shades: White and Black – i.e. there are both
White (European) and Black (referring to Ethiopians) colonizers. Despite the ousted government’s ‘marathon’
Border Agreements, the revolutionary regime simply regarded all border treaties
as null and void; and thus an atmosphere of “no war and no peace” was created
in the region.
The Somali
military leadership also declared without hesitation that they will employ the
use of force, as an ultimate answer, to unite Somalis in the region and resolve
the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia.
The leader of the Somali Revolution, Mohamad Siyad Barre,
expressed his dissatisfaction with the OAU and the UN efforts to solve the
prolonged Somali dilemma; and subsequently, he prepared the Somali nation to go
to war.
Therefore,
the lessons to be learned from the 1960s’ foreign intervention in the politics
of the Somali State have been disastrous. So far, all the previous means utilized by
foreign forces/agencies to intervene in Somali politics – including
misinformation, manipulation, and conspiracy against the Somali nation-State –
produced bad harvests or may I say remained in the memories of few Somali
individuals.
Premier
Ghedi’s Remarks: Flippant or Optimistic Outreach
Unless we
overturn Premier Ghedi’s remarks (on Somali Weyn issue) and read
it in the context of ‘optimistic outreach’, mainly catered to the ‘spirit’ of
IGAD propositions and efforts of regional stability and cooperation, the 1960s futile
strategies of “I jiid aan ku jiidee” scenario inside the Somali
parliament seems unfolding again. For
example, in mid 1964, an uproar and misunderstanding created a heated debate in
the parliament, splitting the Somali National Assembly when the then Prime
Minister, Abdirizak Haji Hussein put forth a sensitive program on the
table, regarding the issue of Somali Weyn. Regrettably, the program was named: “The Destiny
of the Somalis Living in Ethiopian Territory and NFD.” The importance and the sensitivity of the Somali
Weyn feelings, inside the walls of the Somali Parliament, have been
recorded expressively by Jeanne Contini in this manner:
All opposition speakers chose to interpret
the reference to “in Ethiopian territory, etc.” as government acknowledgment of
Ethiopian and Kenyan Sovereignty over Somali in-habited areas, thus concluding
that the government had no intention of liberating the territories under foreign
rule. The Prime Minister explained that
there had been a misprint in the first published version of the program, and
that the reference was later corrected to read “The Destiny of Somali
Territories under Ethiopian and Kenyan Domination.” In countering the attack, he also called the
attention to the fact that a Minister (without portfolio) for Somali Affairs
had been included in the Cabinet for the first time, and that his function was
expressly to deal with the problems of “Greater Somalia.” (One deputy thereupon criticized the title of
the new Minister as having been inspired by foreigners, because it should have
been “Minister for the Somali Affairs under Foreign Rule”) [8].
Bearing in
mind the history of Somali Weyn controversy, conventional wisdom also
informs us that due to the current tragic situation the TFG would not dare now
to risk losing the support of Ethiopia and Kenya for the sake of Somali Weyn
Principle. In addition, the
clan-infested Somalis of today might also be reluctant to deal now any border
disputes with their neighbours. Although
we could not be certain about how Ethiopia and Kenya may respond to the re-emergence of Somali
Weyn tendencies in Somalia, a military option will be their least
option. Our neighbours are aware of the
fact that Somali clannism presented them a valuable gift – i.e. an opportunity
for covert operation. An open conflict
between Clan-loyalty and State-loyalty is now fighting on the common grounds of
Somali once again. It is therefore very
difficult to tell a Somali from a Kenyan or Ethiopian; in fact, all sides are
represented by Somali clans. A token
subsidy can provide opportunities for recruiting clan-oriented Somalis as
foreign agents.
Publicly, Prime
Minister Ghedi should not however risk appearing to be too soft on “One
Somalia” Principle because, as he is aware of it, recruiting Somali nomads by
foreigners will not last that long.
After all, nomad-loyalty is like a moving cloud which often betrays, and
often shows us the nakedness of the true blue-sky. Thus, he should rather be remembered for
achieving a “truce’ and understanding that concerns on our neighbours, without
creating a political blunder. Yet, he
has also to make sense to attract Somalis in order to look credible and
trustworthy.
In doing so,
the Prime Minister freezes his local enemies without a battle; he alienates
them without insulting them and crushes their Isbaaro fiefdoms without
military operations. To succeed in this
strategy, the Premier has to convince all sides of the equation that he is
prepared to act as a goodwill politician who is willing to avoid flippant
remarks, irrespective of the consequences.
In this way, the Prime Minister can reason his intent to tone down his
declamatory speeches on the issue of Somali Weyn, unlike the
forthright declamation speeches delivered by his predecessors. Finally, he should remind the Somali populace
to espouse and commit their efforts to rebuild their shattered Somali Republic; and only then, when the Republic
earns the rightful international recognition for the status of “recuperated” Somalia, can the issue of border talks
resume on an equal footing.
A.
S. Faamo
Roobdoon
Forum
Toronto,
Canada
roobdoon2000@yahoo.ca
References:
[1] A telephone-
interview with the BBC World Service, Somali Section, on November 11, 2005.
[2] An interview
conducted at the Premier’s Office in November
30th 1963.
Sources from The New York Times and Hindustan
Times, New Delhi.
[3] Africa
Confidential, No. 1, (January 10, 1964), p. 7.
[4] Rogers
Morris and Richard Mauzy, “Following the Scenarios: Reflections on Five Case
Histories in the Mode and Aftermath of CIA Intervention”, in The CIA File
(New York: Grossman Publishers, 1976), edited by Robert L. Borosage and John
Marks, p. 28.
[5] On the first week of September, 1968, the Ethiopian
Herald covered Premier Egal’s four-day official visit to Addis
Ababa. Mr. Egal
signed a joint communiqué with Ethiopia
that aimed to create a good neighbourly relation between the two
countries. Immediately after he signed
the communiqué with his counterpart, Mr. Akilu Habtewold, Ethiopian Herald
published Egal’s comments about the talks between the two sides, stating that
he has said, “It is going to be the beginning of a new era in the
Ethiopian-Somali relation.” Also, Roobdoon Forum has posted the Somali
Border Agreements on the following websites:
http://www.biyokulule.com/somali%20border.htm
http://www.dhahar.com/articles/roobdoon101105.html
http://www.laasqoray.net/article.php?articleid=565
http://www.radiosanaag.com/roob.htm
[6] Rogers
Morris and Richard Mauzy, “Following the Scenarios: Reflections on Five Case
Histories in the Mode and Aftermath of CIA Intervention”, in The CIA File
(New York: Grossman Publishers, 1976), edited by Robert L. Borosage and John
Marks, p. 3-38.
[7] Luigi
Pestalozzi, The Somalian Revolution, translated from Italian by Peter
Glendening (Paris: Editions Afrique Asie Amerique Latine, 1974), p. 40.
[8] Jeanne Contini,
“The Somali Republic:
Politics with a Difference,” Africa Report,
Vol. 9. No. 10 (November, 1964), p. 6.